Naturalization Visualized:
A Study of Canadian Citizenship Data

Executive summary

This analysis builds on Statistics Canada’s findings of a sharp decline in naturalization rates among immigrants within 5 to 9 years of arrival, dropping from 75.4% in 1996 to 45.7% in 2021. Focusing on education, language, and income as key factors affecting naturalization rates, it contrasts demographic and socioeconomic characteristics between naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants across different time periods. In doing so, it highlights the interplay between policy changes, socioeconomic factors, and citizenship uptake. The analysis draws from 2021 and 2016 Census data and includes comparisons of immigrants who arrived between 2011-15 (Census 2021 data) and 2006-10 (Census 2016 data). These represent two equivalent cohorts (5 to 9 years after arrival) across both Census periods where immigrants were eligible to apply for citizenship.

Key findings

To reverse the trend of declining citizenship rates, the government should allocate a larger portion of its settlement services budget to programs that educate, encourage and prepare immigrants for citizenship. Furthermore, to maintain focus on the issue, governments should adopt meaningful performance targets focused on the naturalization rates of recent immigrants – those who arrived within 5-9 years – and expand the availability of data on the citizenship process to enable better tracking. While modernization efforts are critical to improving operations and processing capacity, the government must avoid diminishing the value of citizenship. It can achieve this by making citizenship a more visible and celebrated part of the immigration journey, such as highlighting the meaningful impact of in-person ceremonies to immigrants and the greater public.

Introduction

Statistics Canada’s analysis of factors influencing naturalization in 2019 and the 2024 update  identify three main factors: “lower family income levels, lower levels of education and poorer official language skills.” These factors are mutually reinforcing; immigrants who are disadvantaged by all three factors do considerably worse than those who have higher education levels, family income and stronger language skills.

This analysis delves deeper into these factors and compares the characteristics of naturalized Canadians and non-citizens, focusing on the most recent period when all immigrants met the residency requirement to become citizens: five to nine years after landing. For the 2021 Census, this period spans 2011-2015, while for the 2016 Census, it covers 2006-2010.

The study provides a demographic profile for these specific periods as well as for all immigrants, examining age, gender, country of birth, education, income, employment, province, periods of immigration, admission category, and labour force participation and employment. Over the past two decades, significant global and Canadian environmental changes have occurred. However, this analysis focuses specifically on the two most recent census periods when immigrants would have met residency requirements: the 2011-2015 period for Census 2021 and the 2006-2010 period for Census 2016. Major events during these years, including the 2008-2009 banking crisis, the 2011 stock market crash, oil price fluctuations, and mass refugee arrivals in the EU, among others, have influenced naturalization through various push and pull factors, alongside operational issues within the Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).

Demographics

As expected, notable differences exist between immigrants from all periods and those from recent periods, as contrasted between Tables 1 and 2, which show the age distributions of immigrants from major source countries. The average age of all immigrants is 52 years, with considerable variations. Nearly 50 percent of earlier waves from Europe are over 65 years old, with an average age of 59, contrasted with only 14 percent from Africa (average age 44) and 20 percent from Asia (average age 48).

In the most recent period where all immigrants met residency requirements, spanning 5 to 9 years after landing, the demographics naturally reflect lower numbers of seniors and lower average ages, as shown in Table 2. Our earlier study indicated that over 90 percent of immigrants choosing to become citizens do so within this timeframe. Given the focus on this recent period, there is relatively little variation in the number of seniors and average age. Americans exhibit the lowest average age at 32 years, while China shows the highest at 44.

The overall demographic profile closely resembles that of the previous 2016 Census, covering the most recent period from 2006 to 2010. Both recent waves exhibit an average age of 35, with less than five percent aged 65 years or older. Approximately 10 percent of immigrants from Europe (2011-2015) and 13 percent from the 2006-2010 period fall into the senior category.

Table 3 compares the average age of immigrants across all periods with the 2011-2015 period from the 2021 Census and the same 5 to 9 years after landing, 2006-2010, from the 2016 Census. The overall demographic profile remains largely comparable: both recent waves exhibit an average age of 35, with less than five percent aged 65 years or older. Approximately 10 percent of immigrants from Europe (2011-2015) and 13 percent from the 2006-2010 period fall into the senior category.

In the 2011-2015 period, immigrants from China, Fiji, Guyana, India, and Sri Lanka had the highest average ages, all exceeding 40. No source country had an average age under 30. The 2006-2010 period presented some differences: countries with an average age of over 40 included Fiji, Croatia, Guyana, Poland, and India, with four countries boasting an average age under 30: Greece, Kenya, the USA, and Israel. The USA stands out as the only developed country with a significant proportion of young immigrant citizens.

Immigrants comprised over one quarter of the Canadian population in 2021. Table 4 compares naturalization rates across all periods of immigration, highlighting countries with rates higher or lower than the average.

A clear distinction emerges before the year 2000, with all countries boasting citizenship rates of 90 percent or more. The USA stands as the only exception, historically exhibiting limited interest in Canadian citizenship due to perceived limited advantages compared to American citizenship and passport.

Subsequent periods reflect a blend of general and more specific factors. International mobility and economic opportunities in several countries diminish the appeal of Canadian citizenship, particularly among many European immigrants. Despite a general liberalization of dual citizenship, this trend has not been adequately countered. In contrast, countries facing relatively poor economic prospects, civil strife, or other forms of violence tend to maintain above-average naturalization rates across all periods.

Lower naturalization rates for the 2011-2015 period could possibly reflect the disproportionate effects of operational and policy changes, as well as the impact of the pandemic on citizenship processing, estimated by Statistics Canada to account for up to 40 percent of the overall decline.

The 2016-2021 period is included for reference purposes but holds less significance, as less than half of the immigrants would have met residency requirements during this time.

Table 5 highlights naturalization rates of immigrants from the top 50 immigration source countries, categorized into Canadian only, dual citizens, and non-citizens (chart limited to top ten, full dataset available as download below chart). Countries permitting dual citizenship tend to have a higher percentage of dual citizens, while those with the highest rates of non-citizens often correlate with the prohibition of dual citizenship, such as China, India, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. However, this correlation is not universal, as evidenced by countries like Iran, Guyana, Philippines, USA, Korea, France, Mexico, Syria, Nigeria, and Brazil, which permit dual citizenship.

Table 6 provides a comparable examination of the 2011-2015 period, representing 14 percent of all immigrants (top ten displayed, data for top 50 available for download below the chart). Source countries have shifted, reflecting recent immigration patterns, with 14 new additions: Cameroon, Congo DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Eritrea, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Mauritius, Moldova, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, and Venezuela, replacing previous countries such as Chile, Croatia, El Salvador, Fiji, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, and Turkey. Generally, recent immigrant groups exhibit lower naturalization rates.

The correlation between dual citizenship and non-citizens remains unclear for the most recent period. Using a 50 percent threshold or higher for non-citizens, countries that prohibit dual citizenship include India, China, and Japan, whereas countries that permit it include the USA, UK, Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, and Ireland.

Table 7 compares the 2021 and 2016 Census periods, during which all immigrants were eligible to become citizens (top ten displayed, data for top 50 available for download below chart). This table underscores the significant increase in the number of non-citizens, an absolute difference of 28.4 percent, in contrast to the 7 percent increase of immigrants. The largest source countries reflect this overall trend towards a higher percentage of non-citizens, with the Philippines at 64 percent, India at 47 percent, and China at 40 percent. Roughly one-third of countries experienced an increase of 50 percent or more, while only Germany and Egypt witnessed a small decline in the number of non-citizens. The overall naturalization rate declined from 68.5 percent in 2006-2010 to 57.5 percent in 2011-2015.

Of the largest three source countries, only China shows a decrease in the number of immigrants. Approximately half of the source countries among the top 50 experience a decrease in the number of immigrants, largely reflecting shifts in source countries. There seems to be a limited correlation between the increase in non-citizens and the numbers of immigrants; the ratio between immigrants and non-citizens generally tends to be higher for countries with increased immigration, and conversely lower for source countries with decreased immigration.

Table 8 delves into gender distribution of non-citizens by source country (top ten displayed, data for top 50 available for download below chart). The overall gender balance for immigrants falls between 52 and 53 percent women, with a slight decline to 51.4 percent in the 2016-2021 period. The proportion of women is lowest among immigrants from Hong Kong, Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Greece, and Israel. Regarding citizenship, approximately one-third of countries have women constituting less than half of all citizens. Women make up more than 55 percent of all citizens in countries like the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Poland, Sri Lanka, Korea, Guyana, Haiti, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Taiwan, Chile, and Fiji. With some exceptions, these patterns are observed across Canadian-only citizens, dual citizens, or non-citizens.

Table 9 compares non-citizens by education level for Census 2021 and 2016 (covering all immigration periods for both). Gender differences are relatively minor in both censuses, but the overall percentage of non-citizens is greater for all education levels in Census 2021, significantly higher than in Census 2016, particularly among university-educated immigrants.

Despite refugees having the lowest level of education attainment, less than 40 percent college and above (25-64 year olds), their naturalization rate is comparable to economic class immigrants, highlighting the importance of citizenship for refugees compared to the family category.

Table 10 contrasts the changes in immigration and citizenship across the two census periods at the provincial level. British Columbia, Ontario, and Alberta have witnessed the most significant decline in naturalization. Concurrently, immigration has surged in all provinces, particularly from 2011-2015 to 2016-2020, exacerbating pressure on citizenship processing. Given Quebec’s lower immigration, naturalization has decreased less than the other large provinces. To alleviate the resulting high backlog, there has been widespread adoption of less significant video ceremonies, accounting for approximately 90 percent of all new citizens. As a result, in calendar years 2022 and 2023, almost 750,000 individuals obtained new citizenship status.

Immigration Category

Table 11 contrasts the last census period in which all immigrants were eligible for citizenship by immigration category with earlier immigration periods. For context, data from before 1981 to 2000 shows largely comparable and stable naturalization rates across all groups.

Refugees generally exhibit higher naturalization rates than other categories, including economic immigrants, with rates at 67 percent compared to 61 percent for economic immigrants, and only 44 percent for family class immigrants in Census 2021. The variation between categories is narrower in Census 2016, with economic and family class at 71 percent and family class at 62 percent. This discrepancy is unsurprising considering the advantages and security that citizenship provides refugees, despite many refugees facing challenges related to education, language, and income.

Naturalization rates for family class immigrants have declined more steeply than for the other two groups since 1996. While some of this decline may be attributed to operational and policy changes under the Conservative government, it is more likely that longer-term factors such as education, language proficiency, and income levels play a greater role. Analysis of time to naturalization data reveals that family class immigrants take longer to naturalize, with an average of 6.3 years (2005-2022 data), compared to 5.3 years for economic immigrants and 5.1 years for refugees.

There is no strong pattern to naturalization rates across categories based on general economic strength for economic immigrants, and variation is small compared to the two census periods. Generally, countries with high and low naturalization rates rank relatively similarly for economic immigrants and refugees, but vary more significantly for family class immigrants, both within each census period and between the two periods. Some of this variation likely reflects changes in application processes and requirements, such as program integrity measures, lotteries and intake caps for parents and grandparents, conditional permanent residence for spouses, income requirements, length of financial undertaking, and the super visa. A wider range of naturalization rates exists for refugees compared to other categories.

A majority of immigrants from most of these countries are economic immigrants, with exceptions including Colombia, Haiti, Iraq, Jamaica, Mexico, Sri Lanka, USA, and Vietnam. Among these exceptions, family class immigrants constitute more than 30 percent of immigrants from China, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, USA, and Vietnam. Refugees form a majority from Colombia and Iraq, and over a quarter from Haiti and Sri Lanka. China has the lowest naturalization rates across all categories, while India, Korea, UK, and USA also have low rates among family class immigrants. UK and Korea also have low rates among economic immigrants in Census 2021. The same pattern is observed for China in Census 2016, along with the UK and USA for family class immigrants.

The following three tables examine the naturalization rate by immigration category. Table 12 contrasts the naturalization rate by country of birth for economic class immigrants. There was an overall decrease of 14.1 percent, with Mexico, India, the Philippines, China, and Korea all experiencing a decline of 20 percent or more over the two periods. Only Vietnam, Lebanon, and Egypt experienced a modest increase.

Table 13 contrasts the naturalization rate by country of birth for family class immigrants. The overall decrease was much higher than that of the economic class, at 28.3 percent. Twelve countries experienced a decline of 20 percent or more (Iran, Russian Federation, Bangladesh, Colombia, UK, Philippines, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, USA, India, Korea, and China), with no source country experiencing an increase.

Table 14 contrasts the naturalization rate by country of birth for refugee class immigrants. In contrast to the other classes, refugees experienced the lowest decline in naturalization, at 6.4 percent. Ten countries experienced an increase (Korea, UK, Haiti, Bangladesh, USA, Nigeria, Mexico, Jamaica, Morocco, and Egypt). Three countries experienced a decline of 20 percent or more: France, India, and China (though there were too few refugees from the Philippines to draw conclusions). This once again reinforces that citizenship is a relatively higher priority for refugees compared to other categories.

Income and Labour Force Status

Naturalization correlates with income: generally, non-citizens, particularly those in the economic class, have lower incomes across all periods of immigration. Table 15 contrasts findings from Census 2021 with those from Census 2016 regarding median after-tax income by category and gender, reflecting this overall pattern, with the exception of secondary education applicant men. For men, the difference is generally lower than for women across both periods, but women’s median incomes in 2006-2010 are relatively higher than in 2011-2015. Part of this difference may be explained by the citizenship backlog, with a higher percentage of non-citizens.

The significant reduction in wage gaps for the 2011-2015 period compared to the 2006-2010 period likely reflects the increased numbers of temporary residents, particularly those with higher skills under the International Mobility Program, including international students under the Post-Graduate Work Program.

Income correlates with education level, as illustrated by Table 16 for both citizens and non-citizens, with significant differences particularly at the lowest and highest levels of education. The percentage of immigrants who are university graduates has increased from 34 percent for the 2006-2010 period (Census 2016) to 44 percent for the 2011-2015 period (Census 2021). Trades, arguably where labour shortages are greater, have remained around five percent for both periods. Gender differences are generally not significant, with the greatest difference observed between college-educated men and women. Government transfers are significantly lower for non-citizen men, but less so for non-citizen women, reflecting in part that women constitute 53 percent of all women seniors and other social programs that apply to other age cohorts.

The same correlation is evident regarding poverty rates, with rates reaching 50 percent or higher for non-citizens, both men and women, across all education levels as depicted in Table 17. Poverty rates are notably lower for non-citizens with trades education. For citizens, low poverty rates are observed among those with trades, college, and Bachelor’s or above education, with a significant gender gap for women citizens with trades education. Non-citizen gender gaps are greater than for citizens. In general, over both periods, non-citizens receive a higher percentage of government transfers (e.g., EI, CERB, pensions). Given the smaller proportion of seniors in these periods (between four and five percent of all immigrants, compared to one quarter of the total immigrant population), and thus fewer recipients of OAS and CPP, this is somewhat surprising and likely reflects some of the family benefits (such as childcare and tax credits), as well as EI and income support programs for lower-income immigrants.