Citizenship in decline: The role of dual nationality, immigration category, and wait times
The news that recent immigrant naturalization had dropped by 40 percent over the last 20 years provoked considerable soul searching regarding the experience of newcomers to Canada. While the drop reflects the virtual shutdown of the citizenship program during the initial months of the pandemic, it also follows a more concerning downward trend in naturalization going back to 1996. To better understand recent dynamics of naturalization, this analysis examines the impact of source country prohibitions on dual citizenship, the time between arrival in Canada and taking up citizenship, and the impact of the shutdown. The analysis indicates that restrictions on dual nationality have only a limited impact on naturalization overall. It also reveals that the ten years following arrival as a permanent resident is a critical period for naturalization and that the average time between landing and naturalizing has increased. It highlights the need for a more meaningful and time-bound performance standard for Canada’s citizenship program, setting a naturalization target of 75 percent for immigrants who arrived five to nine years ago, or the previous census period.
Source country dynamics evolving, but dual nationality prohibitions have limited impact on citizenship rates overall
To assess the degree to which a source country allowing or prohibiting dual citizenship plays a role in naturalization, we compiled source country citizenship regulations and matched them with overall citizenship rates (indicated in the source tables as the percentage of immigrants who are ‘not citizens’). Using Census 2021, the analysis was conducted for all pre-2011 census periods and compared with the last full census period when all immigrants had met residency requirements (2011-15). The percentage distribution of ‘not citizens’ from countries that allow versus prohibit dual citizenship is largely the same during both periods, as shown in Figure 1 (Not Citizens tab, below).
Figure 1. Distribution of ‘not citizens’ and ‘all immigrants’ by source countries that allow vs. prohibit dual citizenship (pre-2011 and 2011-15 immigrant landing cohorts)
Switch between two charts by clicking on the appropriate tab, below
Figure 1: Do Dual Citizenship Prohibitions Affect Naturalization Rates?
Source: Census 2021. Time periods: All pre-2011 census periods, 2011-15, less than one percent unknown. Percentage weighted by numbers of citizens and immigrants.
Figure 1 also contrasts the percentage distribution of ‘not citizens’ with the percentage distribution of all immigrants from countries that allow or prohibit dual citizenship for the pre-2011 census periods and the 2011-15 period from Census 2021 (All Immigrants tab, above). The data reveal that a greater percentage of all immigrants are from source countries that prohibit dual citizenship in the most recent period. Pre-2011 numbers include large numbers of previous waves of immigration from Europe, whereas 2011-15 numbers are overwhelmingly from developing countries, including the large numbers of immigrants from India and China, countries which do not allow dual citizenship. As a result, the percentage of immigrants from countries that do not allow dual citizenship has increased from 28 to nearly 38 percent, despite an overall trend toward more liberalized dual citizenship policies globally. In terms of the impact on naturalization rates overall, a greater increase in immigrants from the Philippines, which allows dual citizenship, counterbalances the impact of India and China’s prohibition on dual citizenship (country-specific details are found in Figure 2).
Figure 2 examines the citizenship of the top 25 immigration source countries (2018 base), separated out by whether dual citizenship is allowed or prohibited, comparing immigrant landings between 2006-10 in Census 2016 with immigrant landings between 2011-15 in Census 2021. These represent equivalent cohorts when all immigrants met the citizenship residency requirement at the time of each respective census.
Figure 2. Naturalization among top 25 source countries (percentage of ‘not citizens’)
2018 basis, comparison of 2006-10 immigrant landings (Census 2016) vs. 2011-15 immigrant landings (Census 2021)
Switch between countries that allow or prohibit dual citizenship by clicking on the appropriate tab, below
Figure 2: Naturalization Rates (Dual Citizenship Allowed)
Figure 2: Naturalization Rates (Dual Citizenship Prohibited)
Source: Census 2016 for immigrant landings 2006-10, Census 2021 for immigrant landings 2011-15 (previous census period)
The extent to which dual citizenship prohibitions are enforced is apparent from the contrast between China and India, with high levels of not citizens, and Ukraine, Iran and Cameroon, with low levels. It is worth noting that this is a relatively recent change compared to the previous 2001-10 census period, when naturalization rates for those from India and China were close to the average, with only 19.8 percent of Indian immigrants, and 30.6 percent of Chinese immigrants not taking up Canadian citizenship during 2001-10. It is likely that greater economic opportunities in India and China or elsewhere played a role in this shift. As noted above, the relative greater increase in immigration from the Philippines, which allows dual citizenship, compared to India and China which do not, reduces the net impact of dual nationality provisions in terms of Canadian citizenship uptake overall.
Time has increased, but 92% of naturalizations happen within 10 years
Another possible factor influencing naturalization rates is the time immigrants take to become citizens. Using IRCC operational data, average time in number of years between immigration and citizenship was examined by gender, immigration category and source country. Figure 3 shows the distribution of naturalizations across five-year time periods after landing. 46.2% of naturalizations occur within the first five years, while an additional 46% occur between five and ten years.
Figure 3: Distribution of citizenship acquisition across five-year time periods
Figure 3a: Overall Citizenship Acquisition Time Period
Source: IRCC operational data
Overall, the average time to naturalization has increased by about one year, from 5.4 years for the period 2005-10 to 6.3 years in 2021-22, or an increase of 17.3 percent as shown in the bottom bar of Figure 4 (“Total”). Our analysis reveals that the overall increase in time applies to all genders, most immigration categories and a significant number of source countries.
Figure 4 also highlights that the average time for men and women is largely identical, with men naturalizing slightly more quickly than women. From 2005-10 to 2021-22, the average time to become a citizen increased from 5.4 to 6.2 years for men, and from 5.5 to 6.4 years for women.
Figure 4. Citizenship acquisition time and percentage change by gender (years after landing)
Figure 4: Title: Citizenship Acquisition Time and Change by Gender
Source: IRCC operational data
Considerable time variation between immigration categories and programs
The more interesting data is with respect to immigration categories, where there is considerable variation. The overall picture is found in Figure 5, which shows that it is the family class immigrants that have the longest average time to citizenship. From 2005-10 to 2021-22, the average time to become a citizen increased from 5.1 to 6.1 years for the economic category, from 6.3 to 7.4 years for the family category, and from 4.6 to 5.7 years for protected persons.
Figure 5: Citizenship acquisition time and percentage change by immigration category (years after landing)
Figure 5: Title: Citizenship Acquisition Time and Change by Immigration Category
Source: IRCC operational data. Note: Canadian Experience class from 2012, Ministerial instruction, Skilled Trades, Blended from 2018, Public Policy 2007
Figure 6 examines the time to citizenship for the various programs under the economic class. More recent programs such as the small Ministerial Instruction, Skilled Trades, and the Canadian Experience Class have the shortest average time to citizenship, followed by the Provincial Nominee Program. The longest time to citizenship is in the Federal Business and Quebec Business programs. The short-time to citizenship for the Canadian Experience Class reflects their previous work experience and time in Canada (which counts as half a day to a maximum of 365 days for the physical presence requirement) and the related trend towards two-step immigration.
Figure 6: Citizenship acquisition time and percentage change, economic category (years after landing)
Figure 6: Citizenship Acquisition Time by Time and Change, Economic Category
Source: IRCC operational data. Note: Canadian Experience class from 2012, Ministerial instruction, Skilled Trades, Public Policy 2007
For programs that existed in 2005-10, the greatest increase in time to citizenship was for Federal Business (6.9 to 10.9 years), Federal Skilled Workers (5.1 to 7.2 years) and the Provincial Nominee Program (4.1 to 5.8 years).
Figure 7 provides the family category breakdown. Parents and Grandparents have the longest acquisition time, with about 15 percent taking more than 10 years to become citizens. The greatest increase in time to citizenship was for Family Relations, orphaned blood relatives under the age of 18, and some other blood relatives (2.6 to 7.1 years). The smallest increase was for Parents and Grandparents (7.1 to 7.8 years), with the increase for Spouses, Partners and Children being in the middle (6.1 to 7.3 years).
Figure 7: Citizenship acquisition time and percentage change, family category (years after landing)
Figure 7: Citizenship Acquisition Time by Time and Change, Family Category
Source: IRCC operational data
Figure 8 provides the refugee category breakdown. Landed and Dependents (those who arrive independently) have the shortest average citizenship acquisition time, likely reflecting the security that having Canadian citizenship provides. Privately Sponsored Refugees have shorter acquisition times than Government Sponsored Refugees, reflecting the greater support provided by refugee sponsors. Only Privately Sponsored Refugees experience a decline in time to citizenship (6.1 to 5.3 years). The time for Protected Persons Landed increased the most (from 4.0 to 5.6 years) and Government Assisted Refugees the least (5.5 to 6.3 years).
Figure 8: Citizenship acquisition time and percentage change, protected persons category (years after landing)
Figure 8: Citizenship Acquisition Time by Time and Change, Protected Persons Category
Source: IRCC operational data. Note: Blended from 2018
Source country variations are significant
Figure 9 examines the same top 25 immigration source countries sorted by whether or not they permit dual citizenship and acquisition time. There appear to be few common threads between naturalization time and country of citizenship and whether or not dual citizenship is permitted. The USA and UK are exceptions, which likely reflects lower perceived benefits of Canadian citizenship. Immigrants from Iran (from 4.4 to 12.5 years), Colombia (from 3.9 to 6.7 years), China (from 4.7 to 7.9 years) and Sri Lanka (from 5.5 to 9.1 years) had the largest increase in citizenship acquisition time, likely reflecting security vetting delays. Only Jamaican immigrants had a reduced acquisition time, from 8.8 to 7.2 years.
Figure 9: Citizenship acquisition time period and percentage change by country of birth (years after landing)
Top 25, 2018 basis, organized by dual nationality, percent change
Switch between countries that allow or prohibit dual citizenship by clicking on the appropriate tab, below
Source: IRCC operational data
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Figure 9: Citizenship Acquisition Time by Country of Birth, Top 25 Source Countries
Pandemic shutdowns impacted an already declining naturalization rate
Prior to the pandemic, an average of 21,000 immigrants became citizens per month in 2019 or 250,513 for the full year. Post-pandemic, the monthly average dropped to 5,600 (March 2020 to April 2021), or a drop of close to 75 percent. Thus, the shutdown and gradual restarting had an impact on the processing of citizenship applications and indeed the number of new citizens during this census period. The overall naturalization rate for all eligible immigrants (three years residency) fell from 85.8 percent in 2016 to 80.7 percent in 2021. However, given the general downward trend in naturalization among recent immigrants from 1996 onward, the precise impact of the shutdowns on the overall naturalization rate is not immediately clear. Additional data and subsequent analysis are required to determine the comparative impact of both the pandemic shutdowns and the ongoing downward trend in naturalization. This will be examined more closely in future analyses.
The need for a meaningful citizenship performance standard based on recent immigrants
As noted earlier, the drop in the number of new citizens in the last census period contributed to a drop in the overall naturalization rate for all eligible immigrants: from 85.8 percent in 2016 to 80.7 percent in 2021 (three year residency or 83.1 percent with four year residency requirement). While the one-time shock of the pandemic can explain some of this drop, source country data highlights that other longer-term factors also play a role.
The IRCC annual departmental plan will have to report on this drop given that IRCC’s current citizenship performance standard is for 85 percent or more of all eligible immigrants to naturalize, which it has failed to meet.
However, rather than just providing explanations for the drop, IRCC needs to produce a more meaningful report on the number of recent citizenship-eligible immigrants who have naturalized, specifically those who arrived in the last five to nine years, rather than the naturalization rate for all immigrants across all time periods. By using the previous census period, the plan and related performance report would report on recent naturalization rates, for which current program management and policies are responsible and accountable for, as opposed to an average across all available time periods.
Based upon Statistics Canada analysis, this would suggest a performance standard of 75 percent of immigrants who have lived in Canada for five to nine years. As IRCC currently meets this standard (76.4 percent), this change would not be a “stretch” target but one that would be meaningful, hold IRCC accountable and render visible further declines and changes in naturalization in the future.
Methodology
Census data on immigration periods and source country citizenship is from the Statistics Canada table: Immigrant status and period of immigration by place of birth and citizenship: Canada, provinces and territories and census metropolitan areas with parts along with the analytical note Study: A portrait of citizenship in Canada from the 2021 Census.
Time to citizenship data for gender, immigration category and place of birth was provided by IRCC using operational data. Interestingly, the “PR Date unavailable” category within the source data has decreased from 9% in 2005 to 1% in 2022, a welcome improvement.
Data on which countries prohibit or allow citizenship was from Arton Capital, a global citizenship by investment company, which has the useful index Which Countries Allow or Recognize Dual Citizenship?, cross-checked with another company, Henley & Partners, Dual or Multiple Citizenship. The only error with respect to major source countries that we noticed was with respect to the Philippines and Bangladesh, which do allow dual citizenship contrary to what is stated in the Arton index (but not Henley). The variation among countries formally prohibiting dual citizenship suggests that enforcement of the prohibition is mixed.
Andrew Griffith is the author of “Because it’s 2015…” Implementing Diversity and Inclusion, Multiculturalism in Canada: Evidence and Anecdote and Policy Arrogance or Innocent Bias: Resetting Citizenship and Multiculturalism and is a regular media commentator and blogger (Multiculturalism Meanderings). He is the former Director General for Citizenship and Multiculturalism and has worked for a variety of government departments in Canada and abroad and is a fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and Environics Institute.
